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Abstract 
The novel inclination towards applying principles of governance in banks constitutes a great challenge 
to banks around the world, especially in developing countries. It is especially challenging for Lebanese 
banks to apply principles of governance because its economy is passing through a very delicate period. 
This paper aims at studying the extent of commitment of Lebanese banks to principles of governance 
according to Basel Committee. It is of great importance that Lebanese banks should be committed to 
these principles to be able to face present and future challenges since applying principles of 
governance enhances trust of investors, shareholders and other related parties in addition to related 
international organizations which are closely watching the Lebanese economy. The researchers 
utilized a five-point Likert Style questionnaire which includes 56 items and asked employees of 10 
banks operating in Lebanon to respond to them. Among those employees were board members, 
executives, internal auditors and heads of departments. The research reached some important findings, 
most importantly that Lebanese banks are totally committed to principles of governance. This enables 
Lebanese banks to have a positive impact on investors, shareholders and other parties, which might 
enhance the bank’s competitive position and attract a greater number of investors, depositors and 
stockholders. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past few decades, interest in corporate governance has increased greatly among parties 
involved in the financial sector after the financial crisis in East Asia, Latin America and Russia in the 
nineties of the previous century, which was followed by financial and banking collapse of some 
international American companies in 2002, 2007 and 2008. It became a major issue in economies since 
the financial crisis exposed the deficiency which a lot of companies suffer from, especially in the 
banking sector, where the crisis began with many banks falling to reach other financial institutions 
around the world. This showed the size of the gap between practices of these banks’ managements and 
principles set in legislations, especially with the increase in levels of risk that come with the diversity 
of activities. This urged the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) to come forth with a 
report about corporate governance in which CIPE specified rules and principles to practice rational 
management in economic institutions, including banks and other financial institutions, where 
implementing corporate governance is of utmost importance and complexity as these institutions have 
some interrelated factors that no other industry has. 
The term “Corporate Governance” became popular in the nineties of the previous century, especially 
close to end of the decade, when it was used on a wide scale by experts in the field, mainly those who 
work in local, regional and international organizations after the consecutive crises which many 
economies around the world have witnessed in their organizations. Corporate governance gains its 
importance for discovering crimes which led to the above mentioned economic crises in some parts of 
the world since it is considered the most recent trend in monitoring managements of corporate 
organizations to prevent them from misusing authority and to urge them to protect the rights of 
investors and others of interest, improve their performance and accounting practices, and present 
transparent financial and non-financial reports. Banks are different from other corporations since their 
fall impacts a wider range of individuals and leads to weakening the whole financial system, which will 
have negative impacts on the economy of the state as a whole.  
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2015), there are 
six main principles for corporate governance as follows: 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance structure. 
II. The rights and just treatment of stockholders and key ownership function. 
III. Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries. 
IV. The responsibility of stakeholders. 
V. Disclosure and transparency. 
VI. The responsibilities of the board. 
On the other hand, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a report on enhancing 
corporate governance in banks which include standards that banks should implement as follows (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2015): 
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 Members of the board should be fully qualified for their positions since they should agree 
upon the strategic goals of the bank and monitor the management’s implementation and 
progress on them, taking into consideration the welfare of the stakeholders and depositors. 
They should also oversee the bank’s compliance risk management. 
 The existence of an efficient and independent system for risk management to identify, 
monitor and control risk; and have communication within the bank about the risk. The risk 
management reports to the board and senior management. 
 Independence of the internal auditing and controls as it is essential in effective banking 
governance process and in the soundness of the bank in the long-term. 
 The existence of a sound rewards and bonuses system which supports good corporate 
governance and risk management. 
 The bank should have disclosure and transparency to its stockholders, clients and other 
relevant parties. 
 There is a consensus about the framework of the bank’s operations and the legislative 
environment it is committed to. 
This study aims to show whether or not Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). It also discusses whether 
or not applying principles of governance would impact the performance and efficiency of the Lebanese 
banks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) defines governance as the system through which 
corporations are managed, and their activities are controlled (Meteb, 2016). The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines governance as interconnected relations 
among policymakers of a corporation, its board, stockholders and other investors. Corporate 
Governance helps in building trust and transparency, which are necessary for long-term investment and 
business reliability which in turn support strong growth (OECD, 2015).  
Banks have an essential financial intermediation task in a country’s economy; therefore, the community 
and the market are greatly perceptive to any difficulties that might possibly arise because of flaws in 
corporate governance of Banks. After the world financial crisis in mid-2007, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) reconsidered its guiding principles on governance of banks and specified 
that there are many lessons to be learned from the financial crisis (Bank for International Settlements, 
2010). 
Marcinkowsa (2012) designates that the weak and insufficient corporate governance methods of the 
banks were among the most important reasons behind the financial crisis around the world. Kocourek 
et al. (2003) affirm that governance begins among directors of a corporation, in the boardroom. It is 
rooted in how, when, and why they meet, cooperate, and work with each other and with the 
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management. However, benchmark reforms in the behavior and objectives of the directors and CEO are 
pointless except when they are subject to the mechanisms of performance standards, procedures, and 
measurement. This amalgamation of solutions can turn corporate governance from an indistinguishable 
concept into a method to deliver organizational flexibility, vigor and constantly progressing 
performance. Kutubi (2011) studied the impact of the size of the board and independence of its 
members on corporate performance by considering private banks in Bangladesh. The study revealed 
that there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors on the boards and the performance of the banks.  
In their study, Mansur and Tangl (2018) conclude that ownership of an organization has the utmost 
effect on the financial performance of companies. In addition, they found that institutional ownership 
has a better impact on the financial performance of an organization than family ownership. They 
concluded that the financial performance of organizations of different sectors is improving after the 
implementation of corporate governance. Likewise, the results of a study by Tomar and Bino (2012) 
show that the structure of ownership and composition of the board have a great effect on the 
performance of a bank. The results of their study specify that banks with a majority of institutional 
possession have top performance and that whenever ownership percentages of managers and board 
members increase, the efficiency of the bank becomes greater. Surprisingly, the size of the board has 
no impact on the performance of banks. 
Shungu et al. (2014) find that there exists a positive relationship between the composition and diversity 
of the board with the performance of the bank. However, the study specified a negative relationship 
between the performance of the bank and the size and committees of the board. Thus, the study 
recommends good practices of governance to be applied so that performance improves in commercial 
banks. These include a better structure of the board, specific duties of directors and transparent 
disclosure. Fanta et al. (2013) find that there are some major factors to impact bank performance. These 
mainly include an absence of implementation of corporate governance standards, as well as accounting 
and auditing standards, high, repeated government intervention and weak legal framework to protect 
minority shareholder rights. 
Nevertheless, Begum and Mohammad (2012) emphasize many problems concerned with the practice of 
corporate governance in the banking industry. These include the creation of the board, task of 
stockholders, general assembly of the board, job of the superior administration, the task of auditors, and 
position of the capital market. In theory, having a big board of directors at an organization helps gather 
a larger number of human resources, have more knowledge and experience and present better 
monitoring and advising for the management (Stepanova & Ivantsova, 2012). However, having too 
many board members may create other types of troubles such as collaboration and communication 
between members of the board.  
Xavier et al. (2015) find that variables of corporate governance are not major interpreters which clarify 
the rise in profitability that is signified by return on assets and on equity. They have reached the 
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conclusion that corporate governance using the size of the board, its composition, the duality of CEO as 
well as possession of the institution are not predictors of good financial performance. They 
recommended that the body of commercial banks should provide guidance on the use of practices of 
corporate governance which may positively affect the financial performance of the commercial banks. 
In their staff report no. 539, Merhan and Mollineaux (2012) specify that legislators have many 
approaches to use in order to amplify the production of information. One approach is that they can 
authorize production of information outside of markets through increased disclosure. Another approach 
is that they can encourage prospective information producers directly through altering their motives. 
Conventional approaches to bank governance may hinder the information content. Therefore, 
ambiguity in the banking sector may be a symptom, but not the primary cause of bad governance. The 
study recommends that restructuring, which encourages the quality of security prices through the 
production of information, can improve the governance of banks and other financial institutions.  
There are very few researches that examine the relationship between corporate governance of an 
organization and the extent of information which is asymmetric. Studies that examine the relationships 
between corporate governance for banks or other organizations and asymmetric information deal with 
limited feature or features, or individual instruments, of corporate governance. Holm and Scholer 
(2010), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) and Hillier and McColgan (2006) find that independence of the 
board reduces asymmetric information. On the other hand, Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that 
independence of the board helps the reliability of financial statements. 
The study done by Caleb et al. (2015) specify that there is no difference of statistical significance 
between practices of corporate governance among the Deposit Money Banks (DMB) based on the 
shareholders’ opinion. It also concludes that there is a relationship of statistical significance between 
the performance of the DMBs’ and variables of corporate governance and that the corporate 
governance variables have impacted DMBs’ performance positively and negatively at the same time. 
The researchers recommend workshops to increase the level of awareness among shareholders and to 
enhance their experience in promoting efficient practices of governance in banks where they own 
shares.  
The results of the study done by Belhaj and Cesario (2016) show that the size of the board and has a 
positive and significant impact on the performance of a bank. Large boards of directors that have more 
women led to better performance of the bank. While the composition of the board and the duality of the 
CEO have no significant effect on the performance of the bank for the European countries. Their 
findings show, during the last financial crisis, that the board size and its composition are significantly 
and negatively related to the performance of the bank. Smaller boards of directors which are less in 
number and who are independent (non-executive) have performed much better than the ones with 
larger boards and more independent directors during the crisis.  
The results of Al-Baidhani’s study show that there is an important connection between corporate 
governance and bank performance. Bank age and board meetings have significant, positive effects on 
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Return On Equity (ROE). While the independence of the board and size of the bank have significant 
and negative effects on Return On Assets (ROA). Furthermore, the age of a bank and its board 
committees have positive effects on Profit Margin. Meanwhile, ownership concentration has a negative 
impact on the measure of this profitability. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Research Problem and Hypotheses 
The banking sector is distinct from other types of institutions for its unique nature that comprises a lot 
of risks, which is the essence of its work and the source of its revenues. It is also unique with the 
diversity of the parties of interest which react to it according to its goals and inclinations. This requires 
effective managerial practices on the bank’s side to tackle diverse levels of risks to secure the rights 
and interests of these parties, consequently securing the safety of the bank, which is reflected in the 
stability of the economic position. This is the main goal that bank governance seeks to attain within the 
framework of international rules and principles through the impact on diverse parties of interest. The 
problem of this study may be summed in the following question: 
1) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)? 
The following sub-questions arise from the above question: 
1.1) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding members of the board having qualifications and 
integrity? 
1.2) Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding the role of members of the board of directors. 
1.3) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding independent and efficient audit systems which achieve 
the principle of compliance?  
1.4) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and transparency of financial statements? 
1.5) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of an efficient system for risk management? 
1.6) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of a just and transparent system of benefits 
and rewards? 
1.7) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding supplying all requirements to protect the stockholders’ 
rights? 
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1.8) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding maintaining the rights of all other parties related to their 
work? 
1.9) Are Lebanese banks committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all moral and ethical standards? 
Based on the above question, the researchers have the following hypothesis: 
H1 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS).  
Based on the above hypothesis, the following sub-hypotheses arise: 
H1.1 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding members of the board having qualifications and integrity. 
H1.2 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding the role of members of the board of directors. 
H1.3 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding auditors being independent and efficient. 
H1.4 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and transparency. 
H1.5 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of an efficient system for risk management. 
H1.6 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of a just and transparent system of benefits and 
rewards. 
H1.7 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding supplying all requirements to protect the stockholders’ rights. 
H1.8 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding maintaining the rights of all other parties related to their work. 
H1.9 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all moral and ethical standards. 
3.2 Population and Sample Selection 
The society of the study was parties related to banks operating in Lebanon, of which ten banks were 
chosen. The researchers varied the banks and their regions of operation and varied employees as to 
their different positions and tasks required from them in addition to their authorities and responsibilities. 
The researchers distributed (111) questionnaires among the employees; (110) were valid for testing 
their opinions about the topic of the research, as shown in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample According to Demographic Information 
Variable Category Frequency Percent 
Education Bachelor 58 52.7 
Masters 44 40.0 
Ph.D. 8 7.3 
Years of experience 0-5 years 11 10.0 
5-10 years 32 29.1 
More than 10 years 67 60.9 
Job Position Board Member 24 21.8 
Executive 30 27.3 
Internal Auditor 23 20.9 
Head of department 33 30.0 
Total 110 100.0% 
 
3.3 Instrumentation  
Based on the literature review, the researchers constructed a five-point Likert Style scale questionnaire, 
which is formed of two sections: the first section represents demographic information of the sample 
and is specified by (Education, Years of experience, and Job Position). The second section of the 
questionnaire measures the Extent of Lebanese Banks’ Commitment to Principles of Governance and 
consists of nine main domains. The scale ranges as follows (Table 2): 
 
Table 2. Scale Ranges 
Answer Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Degree 5 4 3 2 1 
 
Findings of the current study show reliability in the data collected through the study tool (questionnaire) 
having Cronbach’s Alpha which reached 0.702 as shown in the Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3. The Value of Cronbach’s Alpha 
No. of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
51 0.702 
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4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
Based on the calculation of the answers average to each domain is determined by the level of the 
answer, the following Table 4 shows the scale used according to the mean and Relative Weight. 
 
Table 4. The Scale Used in the Study to the Mean and Relative Weight 
Mean Relative Weight Approval level 
1 to less than 1.80 20% to less than 36% Strongly Disagree 
1.80 to less than 2.60 36% to less than 52% Disagree 
2.60 to less than 3.40 52% to less than 68% Neutral 
3.40 to less than 4.20 68% to less than 84% Agree 
More than 4.20 More than 84% Strongly Agree 
 
4.1 Testing and Discussing the Hypothesis 
4.1.1 The First Sub-Hypothesis  
To test the hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and the 
rank for each paragraph of the first domain “Qualifications and integrity of members of the board”, 
as follows: 
 
Table 5. Results Analysis of the First Domain “Qualifications and Integrity of Members of the 
Board” 
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
Choosing and appointing 
members of the board is 
based on experience and 
qualifications. 
4.93 0.26 98.5% 77.48 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
Members of the board have 
various, distinct scientific 
qualifications and have 
financial, technical or 
marketing skills. 
4.64 0.48 92.7% 35.51 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
3 
Members of the board have 
good reputation and none of 
them has ever been 
convicted of a crime related 
to honor or integrity. 
4.45 0.55 88.9% 27.48 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
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4 
None of the members of the 
board have caused the fall or 
brought losses to an 
organization in which they 
were members of the board 
administrative officials. 
4.42 0.50 88.4% 30.02 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
5 
None of the members of the 
board have ever announced 
bankruptcy or stopped 
paying debts. 
4.41 0.49 88.2% 31.52 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
6 
6 
None of the members of the 
board have executive 
authority. 
4.52 0.50 90.4% 31.72 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
All items 4.56 0.17 91.2% 75.65 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from Table 5 above that all responses of the study sample on items of the first domain: 
“Qualifications and integrity of members of the board” were “Strongly Agree”, and the mean of the 
responses came between 4.41 and 4.93 (4.56 average). 
To test the first sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding members of the 
board having qualifications and integrity”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the 
null hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles 
of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding members of the board 
having qualifications and integrity, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree expressed with 
the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are 
committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
regarding members of the board having qualifications and integrity. The results (Table 6) showed that 
the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the domain “Qualifications and integrity 
of members of the board” is 4.56, which is greater than the neutral degree (3). Also, the value of 
calculated T is equal to 75.65, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at the significance level α 
≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes that there is a significance 
in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the neutral degree (3) at the 
significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the domain is 91.2%, which 
indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
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Accordingly, the first sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding 
members of the board having qualifications and integrity is accepted. 
4.1.2 The Second Sub-Hypothesis 
To answer this question, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the second domain “The role of the board of directors”, as follows in 
Table 6: 
 
Table 6. Results Analysis of the Second Domain “The Role of the Board of Directors” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The board of directors sets 
an administrative 
framework which defines 
responsibilities. 
4.91 0.29 98.2% 69.33 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
The board of directors 
supervises the strategic 
goals of the bank. 
4.64 0.48 92.7% 35.51 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
3 
The board of directors 
appoints committees (such 
as audit committee, risk 
management committee, 
etc.) which help in 
managing the bank 
properly and efficiently. 
4.64 0.48 92.7% 35.51 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
4 
The board of directors 
appoints the general 
manager, senior officials, 
assistants, experts and 
consultants. 
4.41 0.49 88.2% 29.92 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
9 
5 
The board of directors 
ensures proper safety for 
employees who prepare 
reports related to illegal 
practices at the bank. 
4.43 0.50 88.5% 30.12 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
8 
6 The board of directors 4.58 0.50 91.6% 33.48 0.00 Strongly 4 
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makes sure all bank 
operations are done 
according to rules and 
regulations which govern 
banking. 
agree 
7 
The board of directors 
adopts rational policies for 
human resources 
(employment, 
performance, training, 
discharging and reframing) 
to ensure an efficient and 
qualified management 
staff. 
4.58 0.50 91.6% 33.48 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
8 
The board of directors 
follows up with the 
accuracy of the financial 
statements and makes sure 
they clearly reflect the 
bank’s financial position. 
4.52 0.50 90.4% 31.72 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
7 
9 
The board of directors 
regularly supervises the 
liquidity and financial 
status of the bank to 
safeguard depositors’ 
money. 
4.55 0.50 90.9% 32.40 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
6 
All items 4.58 0.22 91.7% 74.67 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 6 that all responses for the items of the second domain “The role of 
the board of directors” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses ranged between 4.41 and 
4.91 (average 4.58).  
To test the second sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles 
of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the role of 
members of the board of directors”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the null 
hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the role of members of 
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the board of directors, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree expressed with the value (3), 
as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are committed to 
applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the 
role of members of the board of directors. The results (Table 7) showed that the average mean of the 
sample’s responses on all items of the domain “The role of the board of directors” is 4.58, which is 
greater than the neutral degree (3). Also, the value of calculated T is equal to 74.67, which is greater 
than the value of tabulated T at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all 
items of the domain is 91.7%, which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this 
domain. 
Accordingly, the second sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the 
role of members of the board of directors is accepted. 
4.1.3 The Third Sub-Hypothesis 
To answer this question, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the third domain “Independence and efficiency of the audit and 
compliance department at the bank”, as follows in Table 7: 
 
Table 7. Results Analysis of the Third Domain “Independence and Efficiency of the Audit and 
Compliance Department at the Bank” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
Members of the audit and 
compliance department do 
not have executive tasks at 
the bank. 
4.95 0.23 98.9% 89.44 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
The bank assigns an external 
auditor chosen by the 
general meeting on an 
annual basis. 
4.40 0.49 88.0% 29.84 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
3 
The audit and compliance 
department have access to 
all information and direct 
contact with internal and 
external auditors and any 
other employee at the bank 
and other authorities which 
4.53 0.50 90.5% 31.94 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
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enable it to perform its tasks 
efficiently. 
4 
Auditors have the 
experience and 
qualifications necessary for 
them to perform their tasks. 
4.28 0.45 85.6% 29.75 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
5 
The external auditor 
practices his tasks 
independently without any 
interference or pressure from 
the management or the top 
executives. 
4.47 0.50 89.5% 30.80 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
All items 4.53 0.17 90.5% 94.74 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 7 that all responses for the items of the third domain “Independence 
and efficiency of the audit and compliance department at the bank” are “Strongly agree”. The 
mean for the responses ranged between 4.28 and 4.95 (average 4.53).  
To test the third sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding auditors being 
independent and efficient”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the null hypothesis (H0) 
which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles of governance 
according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding auditors being independent and 
efficient, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree expressed with the value (3), as opposed 
to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding auditors 
being independent and efficient. The results (Table 8) showed that the average mean of the sample’s 
responses on all items of the domain “Independence and efficiency of the audit and compliance 
department at the bank” is 4.53, which is greater than the neutral degree (3). Also, the value of 
calculated T is equal to 94.74, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at the significance level α 
≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes that there is a significance 
in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the neutral degree (3) at the 
significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the domain is 90.5%, which 
indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
Accordingly, the third sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding 
auditors being independent and efficient is accepted. 
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4.1.4 The Fourth Sub-Hypothesis  
To test this sub-hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the fourth domain “Commitment to disclosure and transparency”, as 
follows in Table 8: 
 
Table 8. Results Analysis of the Fourth Domain “Commitment to Disclosure and Transparency” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The bank discloses all 
important information about 
all operations and activities 
that it performs through its 
website and its periodical 
and annual reports. 
4.80 0.40 96.0% 46.98 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
Disclosure includes 
important information about 
elements of potential crucial 
risk. 
4.57 0.50 91.5% 33.19 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
3 
The bank is committed to 
performing an annual audit 
by an external auditor to be 
sure of the veracity of 
financial statements. 
4.45 0.55 89.1% 27.61 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
4 
The bank is committed to 
disclosing its financial 
statements and the external 
auditor’s report on the 
results of his work. 
4.35 0.48 86.9% 29.54 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
6 
5 
The bank’s management is 
committed to disclosing 
accounting policies about 
risks to the bank. 
4.36 0.54 87.3% 26.62 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
6 
The bank is committed to 
disclosing information 
relative to framework of its 
capital, assets and of selling 
4.37 0.49 87.5% 29.64 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
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any part of stocks of the 
board. 
All items 4.48 0.19 89.7% 83.32 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 8 that all responses for the items of the fourth domain 
“Commitment to disclosure and transparency” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses 
ranged between 4.35 and 4.80 (average 4.48).  
To test the fourth sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles 
of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and 
transparency”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the null hypothesis (H0) which 
hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles of governance according to 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and transparency, when the mean is less 
or equal to the neutral degree expressed with the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha 
which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according 
to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and transparency. The results (Table 
9) showed that the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the domain “Commitment 
to disclosure and transparency” is 4.48, which is greater than the neutral degree (3). Also, the value 
of calculated T is equal to 83.32, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at the significance level 
α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes that there is a 
significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the neutral degree (3) 
at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the domain is 89.7%, 
which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
Accordingly, the fourth sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding 
disclosure and transparency is accepted. 
4.1.5 The Fifth Sub-Hypothesis 
To test this sub-hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the fifth domain “Commitment to the availability of an efficient system 
of risk management”, as follows in Table 9: 
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Table 9. Results Analysis of the Fifth Domain “Commitment to the Availability of an Efficient 
System of Risk Management” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The board of managers 
tackles strategic risks that 
threatens the bank as one of 
its most important priorities 
and reviews them 
periodically. 
4.85 
 
0.36 97.0% 53.42 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
2 
The bank adopts a specific 
model for risk management. 
4.96 0.30 99.3% 68.49 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
3 
The role of risk management 
committee is to identify and 
categorize operational and 
market risks, set forth 
appropriate solutions in case 
they happen and recognize 
their impacts. 
4.45 0.55 89.0% 27.39 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
4 
The bank periodically 
monitors the efficiency of its 
capital. 
4.44 0.50 88.8% 30.15 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
5 
The bank honors adopted 
decisions of the central bank 
relative to risk management. 
4.20 0.47 84.0% 26.86 0.00 Agree 5 
All items 4.58 0.24 91.6% 67.93 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 9 that all responses for the items of the fifth domain “Commitment 
to the availability of an efficient system of risk management” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for 
the responses ranged between 4.20 and 4.96 (average 4.58).  
To test the fifth sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of an 
efficient system for risk management”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the null 
hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of an 
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efficient system for risk management, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree expressed 
with the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks 
are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision regarding the presence of an efficient system for risk management. The results (Table 10) 
showed that the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the domain “Commitment to 
the availability of an efficient system of risk management” is 4.58, which is greater than the neutral 
degree (3). Also, the value of calculated T is equal to 67.93, which is greater than the value of tabulated 
T at the significance level α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which 
hypothesizes that there is a significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of the 
sample over the neutral degree (3) at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for 
all items of the domain is 91.6%, which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this 
domain. 
Accordingly, the fifth sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the 
presence of an efficient system for risk management is accepted. 
4.1.6 The Sixth Sub-Hypothesis 
To test this sub-hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the sixth domain “Rewards and bonuses system”, as follows in Table 10: 
 
Table 10. Results Analysis of the Sixth Domain “Rewards and bonuses system” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The bank implements a just 
system for rewards and 
bonuses as compared to 
other banks in Lebanon. 
4.77 0.48 95.5% 38.58 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
The bank implements a 
system for rewards and 
bonuses which complies 
with the job level, 
responsibilities that that 
come with the job, scientific 
qualification, years of 
experience and performance. 
4.40 0.55 88.0% 26.93 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
3 
The system for rewards and 
bonuses is recognized by the 
4.53 0.55 90.5% 28.93 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
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board of directors and is 
known by all employees. 
4 
Rewards for members of the 
board are determined by the 
bonuses committee which 
stems from the board. 
4.27 0.45 85.5% 29.84 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
All items 4.49 0.31 89.9% 51.24 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 10 that all responses for the items of the sixth domain “Rewards 
and bonuses system” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses ranged between 4.27 and 4.77 
(average 4.49).  
To test the sixth sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of a 
just and transparent system of benefits and rewards”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test 
to test the null hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence 
of a just and transparent system of benefits and rewards, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral 
degree expressed with the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that 
Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision regarding the presence of a just and transparent system of benefits and rewards. 
The results (Table 11) showed that the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the 
domain “Rewards and bonuses system” is 4.49, which is greater than the neutral degree (3). Also, the 
value of calculated T is equal to 51.24, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at the significance 
level α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes that there is a 
significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the neutral degree (3) 
at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the domain is 89.9%, 
which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
Accordingly, the sixth sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the 
presence of a just and transparent system of benefits and rewards is accepted. 
4.1.7 The Seventh Sub-Hypothesis 
To answer this question, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the seventh domain “The role of stockholders and securing their rights”, 
as follows in Table 11: 
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Table 11. Results Analysis of the Seventh Domain “The Role of Stockholders and Securing Their 
Rights” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The general meeting has the 
right to appoint and 
discharge members of the 
board, increase the capital 
and dispose the financial 
assets. 
4.81 0.39 96.2% 48.06 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
The stockholders are sure to 
attend general meetings, 
practice their rights in voting 
and ask the external auditor 
about the financial affairs of 
the bank. 
4.55 0.55 91.1% 29.55 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
3 
The bank is committed to 
just treatment for all 
stockholders, including not 
disclosing information from 
the bank to certain 
stockholders than others. 
4.56 0.50 91.3% 32.92 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
4 
The financial statements of 
the bank are reviewed and 
approved at the general 
meeting. 
4.38 0.54 87.6% 26.76 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
5 
The general meeting can 
make modifications in the 
goals of the bank and in its 
constitution. 
4.36 0.54 87.3% 26.62 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
6 
Stockholders encourage 
activities which focus on 
social responsibility of the 
bank. 
4.33 0.53 86.5% 26.44 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
6 
All items 4.50 0.28 90.0% 55.79 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
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It is evident from the above Table 11 that all responses for the items of the seventh domain “The role 
of stockholders and securing their rights” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses ranged 
between 4.33 and 4.81 (average 4.50).  
To test the seventh sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles 
of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding supplying all 
requirements to protect the stockholders’ rights”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to 
test the null hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding supplying 
all requirements to protect the stockholders’ rights, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree 
expressed with the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that 
Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision regarding supplying all requirements to protect the stockholders’ rights. The 
results (Table 12) showed that the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the domain 
“The role of stockholders and securing their rights” is 4.50, which is greater than the neutral degree 
(3). Also, the value of calculated T is equal to 55.79, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at 
the significance level α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes 
that there is a significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the 
neutral degree (3) at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the 
domain is 90%, which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
Accordingly, the seventh sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to 
applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
regarding supplying all requirements to protect the stockholders’ rights is accepted. 
4.1.8 The Eighth Sub-Hypothesis  
To test this sub-hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the eighth domain “Role of other relevant parties and securing rights”, as 
follows in Table 12: 
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Table 12. Results Analysis of the Eighth Domain “Role of Other Relevant Parties and Securing 
Rights” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 
The bank is committed to 
having measures that ensure 
the rights of depositors, 
investors, clients and others 
of interest. 
4.93 0.26 98.5% 77.48 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 
The bank is sure to hold 
periodic meetings between 
the employees and the 
management to exchange 
thoughts and discuss 
suggestions which improve 
performance. 
4.43 0.50 88.5% 30.12 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
3 
The bank is sure that all 
parties of interest have easy 
access for information which 
is transparently disclosed. 
4.35 0.48 87.1% 29.56 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
4 
The bank is committed to 
taking prompt measures that 
tackle any violation for the 
rights of the parties of 
interest. 
4.32 0.47 86.4% 29.55 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
5 
The bank is sure to have a 
good image in the society 
and act responsibly toward 
the environment and the 
society in general. 
4.52 0.50 90.4% 31.72 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
All items 4.51 0.20 90.2% 79.04 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 12 that all responses for the items of the eighth domain “Role of 
other relevant parties and securing rights” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses ranged 
between 4.32 and 4.93 (average 4.51).  
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To test the eighth sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles 
of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding maintaining the 
rights of all other parties related to their work”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test 
the null hypothesis (H0) which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding maintaining 
the rights of all other parties related to their work, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree 
expressed with the value (3), as opposed to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that 
Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision regarding maintaining the rights of all other parties related to their work. The 
results (Table 13) showed that the average mean of the sample’s responses on all items of the domain 
“Role of other relevant parties and securing rights” is 4.51, which is greater than the neutral degree 
(3). Also, the value of calculated T is equal to 79.04, which is greater than the value of tabulated T at 
the significance level α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis which hypothesizes 
that there is a significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of the sample over the 
neutral degree (3) at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight for all items of the 
domain is 90.2%, which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this domain. 
Accordingly, the eighth sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding 
maintaining the rights of all other parties related to their work is accepted. 
4.1.9 The Ninth Sub-Hypothesis 
To test this sub-hypothesis, the researchers calculated the mean, standard deviation, relative weight and 
the rank for each paragraph of the ninth domain “High standards of ethics and conduct”, as follows in 
Table 13: 
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Table 13. Results Analysis of the Ninth Domain “High Standards of Ethics and Conduct” 
Items Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rel. 
weight 
T-test Sig. 
Approval 
level 
Rank 
1 The bank has a written 
code of ethics, which 
identifies morals of taking 
decision and of personal 
conduct. 
4.81 0.39 96.2% 48.06 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
2 The written code of ethics 
is distributed to all 
employees and are trained 
to practice it to ensure its 
full implementation. 
4.50 0.55 90.0% 28.38 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
2 
3 The bank is sure to 
implement the code of 
ethics and compel all 
employees to abide by it. 
4.46 0.55 89.3% 27.75 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
3 
4 The bank is committed to 
circulate the code of ethics 
and include measures in 
the annual report to ensure 
its implementation. 
4.34 0.53 86.7% 26.47 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
4 
5 The code of ethics clarifies 
the consequences of 
whatever violation of any 
of its items. 
4.33 0.53 86.5% 26.44 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
5 
All items 4.49 0.31 89.7% 50.21 0.00 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
It is evident from the above Table 13 that all responses for the items of the ninth domain “High 
standards of ethics and conduct” are “Strongly agree”. The mean for the responses ranged between 
4.33 and 4.81 (average 4.49).  
To test the ninth sub-hypothesis, which is “Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of 
governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all moral 
and ethical standards”, the researchers used the One Sample T-Test to test the null hypothesis (H0) 
which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are not committed to applying principles of governance 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 4, No. 4, 2019 
239 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all moral and ethical 
standards, when the mean is less or equal to the neutral degree expressed with the value (3), as opposed 
to the substitute hypothesis Ha which hypothesizes that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all 
moral and ethical standards. The results (Table 14) showed that the average mean of the sample’s 
responses on all items of the domain “High standards of ethics and conduct” is 4.49, which is greater 
than the neutral degree (3). Also, the value of calculated T is equal to 50.21, which is greater than the 
value of tabulated T at the significance level α ≤ 0.05, which means accepting the substitute hypothesis 
which hypothesizes that there is a significance in the substantial increase in the average responses of 
the sample over the neutral degree (3) at the significance level α ≤ 0.05. In addition, the relative weight 
for all items of the domain is 89.7%, which indicates a high level of agreement from the sample on this 
domain. 
Accordingly, the ninth sub-hypothesis which states that Lebanese banks are committed to applying 
principles of governance according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding 
adopting all moral and ethical standards is accepted. 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study showed the following results: 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding members of the board having qualifications and 
integrity. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the role of members of the board of directors. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding auditors being independent and efficient. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding disclosure and transparency. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of an efficient system for risk 
management. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the presence of a just and transparent system of 
benefits and rewards. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding supplying all requirements to protect the 
stockholders’ rights. 
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 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding maintaining the rights of all other parties related to 
their work. 
 Lebanese banks are committed to applying principles of governance according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision regarding adopting all moral and ethical standards. 
There is no doubt that applying principles of governance in the Lebanese banks enhances investors’ 
and shareholders’ trust in the work of the board members of the bank and improves the banks’ 
competitive position. However, the Lebanese banks should couple applying principles of governance 
with keeping up to date with everything new issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
especially in those days since Lebanon is going through a delicate economic period. This will lead to 
attracting a greater number of investors, depositors and stockholders, which will be reflected positively 
on the Lebanese economy. 
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